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1 Introduction
There are two main views concerning the effect of unions on the wages and employment of
nonunion workers. The first of these views (crowding or spillover view) holds that unions
increase the wages of their members at the cost of reduced employment in the union sector,
and thus force the displaced workers to migrate to the nonunion sector. The increase in the
labor supply to the nonunion sector then makes the equilibrium wage fall. According to this
view, the nonunion sector behaves competitively, and therefore unionization affects the wages
and employment of nonunion workers solely through the effect that the presence of unions has
on the supply of labor to the nonunion sector.
The second view (union threat view) holds, in contrast, that nonunion firms raise wages to
forestall unionization. However, these firms also reduce employment in response to the higher
wages, pushing the displaced workers into unemployment. Therefore, unions would benefit
employed nonunion workers while hurting those who become unemployed.1
This paper shows that, in accordance with the union threat view, workers’ ability to unionize
forces nonunion employers to pay higher wages. However, in contrast to both standard views,
it also shows that the threat of unionization, despite raising wages, does not lead nonunion
employers to reduce their labor demand, and may even lead to an increase in employment. The
explanation for this apparently puzzling result is that, when workers can unionize, employers do
not behave as wage-takers, but rather consider both wages and employment as strategic vari-
ables that influence the probability of unionization. In this context, it is shown that increasing
employment reduces the expected payoff to workers from unionization, so that firms have an
incentive to overhire. This incentive is, in fact, strong enough to dominate the pressure to reduce
employment because of the higher wages.
To analyze the effects of the threat of unionization on wages and employment, we develop
a model in which firms take into account the effect of their choices on workers’ incentives to
unionize. A fundamental difficulty of such a model is that the payoff workers expect to obtain
from unionization, as well as the effect of firm choices on that payoff, will depend on the model
used to represent union-management bargaining. To overcome this problem, we argue that,
independently of the precise form of the bargaining process, it is reasonable to expect that, as
1See Ehrenberg and Smith (1997) for a textbook exposition of both views.
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employment at the outset of bargaining increases, the resulting negotiated employment will tend
to increase, while the negotiated wage will tend to decrease. In other words, the outcomes of
collective bargaining will tend to be monotone (nondecreasing in one case, nonincreasing in the
other) in the level of employment at the outset of bargaining. We then show that the most
commonly used models of union-management bargaining, the right-to-manage model (which
nests the monopoly union model) and the Nash-bargaining model are monotone in the sense
just described, thus proving monotonicity to be both a sensible and a general characterization
of the possible bargaining processes. Therefore, to guarantee their robustness, we derive all the
results for any monotone bargaining process.
The potential for the threat of unionization to increase wages was first formalized by Sherwin
Rosen (1969). Even though, as mentioned above, this effect is normally associated with a
reduction of employment, the possibility that the union threat may not decrease employment
was already advanced by William Dickens (1986), although his insight does not appear to have
been developed further. In a different context, Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) and (1996b) have also
shown that, when bargaining individually with their employees, firms may have an incentive to
overhire to reduce the negotiated wages.2 More recently, Kuhn and Padilla (2002) have obtained
a similar result using a different bargaining model that allows for both individual and collective
wage bargaining at the firm level.
Although our focus is different, this article is also related to a strand of research, initiated
by Booth (1985), that has studied the endogenous determination of trade union membership in
‘open shop’ environments.3 Within this literature, Naylor and Raaum (1993) and Corneo (1995)
explicitly model the role of management opposition in the determination of union membership.
The paper is organized as follows: the model is introduced in section 2; section 3 defines the
concept of monotonicity of the bargaining process, and section 4 shows that the right-to-manage
and the efficient Nash-bargaining models are monotone; section 5 demonstrates that it is profit-
maximizing to increase wages above the reservation wage to avoid unionization, and section 6,
in turn, presents the result that, despite the higher wages, employment does not fall below the
2Recently, Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) have incorporated this bargaining model into a standard matching model
of the labor market.
3At an establishment with an open shop arrangement, management and a trade union negotiate about pay
and other conditions of work, and the negotiated agreement extends to all employed workers, yet membership in
the trade union is not compulsory.
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competitive level; section 7 discusses the implications of the model and section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a firm that lives for two periods. At the beginning of the first period, the firm hires
l0 employees from a pool of identical workers, who can earn an alternative wage w if they work
elsewhere. The revenue produced by l0 workers in the first period is R0(l0).
While on the job, workers accumulate firm-specific human capital. Therefore, at the end of
the first period, existing employees become more valuable to the firm than alternative workers,
that is, R(l) > R(l) and R′(l) > R′(l), where R(l) and R(l) are the revenues the firm can
obtain in the second period if it employs l skilled (i.e. with specific human capital), or unskilled
workers, respectively. R0, R, and R are assumed to be nondecreasing in l, concave, and twice
continuously differentiable functions. The acquisition of human capital also implies that R > R0,
and R′ > R′0.
At the beginning of the second period, the firm decides how many employees to retain, l, and
offers those workers a wage w. In most models, which do not take into account the possibility
that workers may organize for the purpose of collective bargaining, workers would then have two
choices: they could either accept the offer or reject it, leave the firm and earn the alternative
wage. Once we recognize that workers have the ability to unionize, however, there is another
option open to them: they can unionize, incurring organization costs C(l). If workers unionize,
collective bargaining takes place, and, as a result, lu(l) ≤ l employees are retained, and a wage
wu(l) is set. Both lu and wu are expressed as functions of l, since the bargaining outcome may
conceivably depend on the level of initial employment.
In the model, the presence of specific skills (or, more generally, of hiring, training and firing
costs) creates quasi-rents over which the firm and its employees may bargain only if the latter
organize to bargain collectively. The assumption that workers have no individual bargaining
power in this context is made only for simplicity: none of the results in the paper would change
qualitatively if we allowed for individual bargaining power, as long as employees’ bargaining
power is greater if they bargain collectively.4
4See Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) and Stole and Zwiebel (1996b) for a discussion of firm behavior under individual
wage bargaining.
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The model also assumes that organization is costly for workers: they need to put time and
effort into organizing and may suffer from retaliatory measures that employers may take to fight
the unionization attempt.5 Even if workers “hired” an existing union to set up a local at the firm,
so that part of these costs would be borne by the union, they would still have to pay initiation
fees and union dues. The actual process of organization, however, is left unmodeled: throughout
the paper we adopt instead a reduced-form approach, summarizing the whole process by a single
variable that represents the costs of unionization to workers, C(l). This formulation allows for
the possibility that management opposition may defeat the unionization attempt, which would
be equivalent to a high enough C. In accordance with the assumption of identical workers, it
is also assumed that the union is formed by all existing workers and that all workers contribute
equally to the total costs of organization, so that there is a de facto closed shop.
3 Collective Bargaining
If workers unionize, the union negotiates with management over wages and, possibly, employ-
ment. The result of this negotiation will depend on the objectives of the union and the way in
which bargaining takes place. Unfortunately, there is no consensus in the literature as to which
is the bargaining model that best captures the actual process of union-management bargain-
ing.6 Moreover, different models yield very different implications. For example, right-to-manage
models typically imply that workers are paid their marginal products, and that the level of
employment is inefficiently low. In contrast, in efficient bargaining models wages may be set
above the marginal product, and the level of employment above the competitive level. In the
latter models, the bargaining outcome is efficient.
However, despite this diversity, the nature of the production technology and the character-
istics of the product market may impose constraints on the bargaining outcome independent of
the specificities of the bargaining process. In particular, a technology with a decreasing labor
marginal productivity or a downward-sloping demand curve for the firm’s output will imply
that, for any given firm, the marginal revenue product of labor (R′) is decreasing in l, as in the
5These are very real costs. In the U.S., a measure of them is given by the number of unfair labor practice
complaints issued by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). In 1994, the ratio of this number to the number
of union recognition elections was 0.843 (Ehrenberg and Smith (1997), p. 493).
6See Macurdy and Pencavel (1986), Pencavel (1991), Booth (1995).
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standard textbook model. And, if this is the case, one would expect that, for low levels of initial
employment at the time of unionization, the union will be able to obtain wages well above the
reservation wage, as infra-marginal rents per worker are large. Moreover, the union will ensure
that all its members remain employed, since the benefit for the workers who remain employed
from a marginal increase in the wage above the wage that guarantees full employment does not
compensate for the large loss experienced by those workers who become unemployed. As initial
employment increases, however, marginal workers become less productive. Therefore, the ability
of the union to extract high wages while guaranteeing the full employment of its members will
be weakened, and the negotiated wage will be pushed down. Finally, when membership is large
enough, the terms of the trade-off between employment and wages may be reversed: at some
point, workers would rather risk losing employment in exchange for a higher wage, than to secure
employment at a wage just above their reservation wage.
To assess the reasonableness of this argument, it is instructive to look at the most widely
used model of collective bargaining, the monopoly union model. According to this model, the
union imposes its wage demands on the employer, who then sets employment at will. Therefore,
the wage is always on the marginal revenue product curve. Figure 1 depicts the bargaining out-
come of the monopoly union model, in which membership is determined by initial employment,
l. In the figure, when initial employment is above l∗u, the negotiated outcome is (w∗u, l∗u). At this
point, the union indifference curve (IC∗) is tangent to the marginal revenue product schedule
(R′). For example, if the level of initial employment is equal to lc (which would be the compet-
itive employment level), the union is willing to accept some unemployment for its members in
exchange for a high wage paid to employed union workers. For levels of initial employment below
l∗u, such as l′, the union does not want to give up employment in exchange for a higher wage,
and, thus, lu(l′) = l′. Note also that the firm’s profits increase as the wage falls and employment
increases along the marginal revenue product curve. In the picture, the firm’s isoprofit curve at
(wu(l′), lu(l′)), (IP ′), is above the isoprofit curve at (w∗u, l∗u), (IP ∗). Since profits increase as we
move to the southeast, this implies that profits are higher at (w∗u, l∗u).
We will use the term monotone to designate any bargaining process that exhibits the rela-
tionship between membership and the negotiated outcome just described. The term has been
chosen to capture the idea that negotiated employment is monotonically nondecreasing and the
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Figure 1: Monotonicity of the Monopoly Union Model
negotiated wage is monotonically nonincreasing in initial employment. The following definition
formalizes the argument.
Definition 1 (Monotonicity) A bargaining process is monotone in l if:
(i) wu(l) is nonincreasing in l.
(ii) There exists a level of membership l∗u such that:
a. For l ≤ l∗u, lu(l) = l
b. For l ≥ l∗u, lu(l) = lu(l∗u) and wu(l) = wu(l∗u).
(iii) ΠU (l) is nondecreasing in l,
where ΠU (l) are the profits earned by a unionized firm that was employing l workers before
unionization.
Condition (i) states that a larger membership will induce the union to accept a lower wage
in exchange for greater employment. Condition (ii) reflects the idea that, for low levels of initial
employment, the negotiated outcome implies the employment of all union members (ii.a), while
for high enough levels of initial employment, the union is not willing to concede any further
reduction in wages and instead accepts some unemployment (ii.b). Condition (ii) thus implies
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that lu(l) is nondecreasing in l. Note that condition (ii.b) can also be interpreted as requiring
a bargaining problem with no restrictions on lu to have a solution. This interpretation shows
that assumption ii.b. is always made implicitly in the literature. Finally, condition (iii) means
that, as in the monopoly union model in Figure 1, restricting initial employment below l∗u does
not increase the firm’s profits.
Although no formal derivation of the results was offered, Figure 1 suggests that the monopoly
union model is monotone. The next propositions show that not only the monopoly union
model, but also the two other most commonly used models of union-management bargaining are
monotone: the right-to-manage model (of which the monopoly union model above is a special
case) and the efficient bargaining model.
4 Monotone Bargaining Processes
4.1 Union Objectives
As mentioned above, there is no consensus as to which is the most adequate choice of the
union’s objective function (and even to whether union decisions can be represented at all as the
outcome of some form of maximization akin to individual utility maximization). In the following
sections, we will assume that the union maximizes the expected utility of all its members, and
that workers are risk-neutral, so that the union strives to maximize its members’ total rents.
The union’s objective function, U , is thus:
U(lu, wu; l, w) ≡ lu(wu − w)
The choice of this specific function, which is probably the single most used objective func-
tion in applications, does not appear to be especially restrictive, as it can be easily extended
to accommodate different union objectives. For example, nothing would change if the union
cared only about initial members, since the negotiated employment cannot be greater than ini-
tial employment. In models where members are heterogeneous, the union may maximize the
expected utility of only some class of workers (like in insider-outsider models) or the expected
utility of the median-voter; in dynamic models, the union would care about some appropriately
discounted sum of the future expected utility of its members, and so on. In all cases, the union’s
objectives can be represented by a function like U . Moreover, it can be shown that many of the
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results derived below would hold for more general objective functions.7
Since w will be assumed to be a constant throughout the paper, U(lu, wu;w) will simply be
written U(lu, wu).
4.2 Bargaining Models
Right-to-Manage Models
Right-to-manage models assume that the firm and the union bargain over the wage, but
management keeps the prerogative to set employment at will. These models are motivated by
the fact that employment is rarely a subject of collective bargaining agreements, at least not in
an explicit way. In most applications, it is assumed that the negotiated wage can be described
as the generalized Nash-bargaining outcome of a bargaining problem in which the effect of wages
in employment is taken into account. Formally, given l, wu(l) is the solution of the following
maximization problem:
max
wu
F (wu, l) = φln (U(lu(wu, l), wu)) (RTM )
+(1− φ)ln(R(lu(wu, l))− wulu(wu, l)),
where lu(wu, l) is the solution of management’s employment choice problem (L) given wu and l:
max
lu
{R(lu)− wulu} (L)
s.t. lu ≤ l,
and φ represents the union’s “bargaining power”. It is assumed, with most of the literature,
that the disagreement payoffs for the union and the firm are both zero. That is, in case of
disagreement, workers can earn w, and the firm does not operate.8
The next proposition shows that, as hinted by the discussion of the monopoly union model
above, right-to-manage models are monotone (all omitted proofs can be found in the appendix).
7For example, the results derived for the right-to-manage model would also hold if we instead used a concave
function of the form U¯(lu, l, wu, w) = g(lu, w)h(wu, w)m(l, w). This formulation nests the expected-utility function
with risk-averse or risk-neutral workers, and the Stone-Geary function, commonly used in empirical work.
8If the Nash-bargaining solution is justified as an approximation to noncooperative bargaining solutions, the
disagreement payoffs should generally be those that the parties would obtain in case of “perpetual disagreement”.
One could think that these payoffs could be different from zero, if the firm can use replacement workers, or if union
workers can earn less than w while negotiations proceed. None of the results would change in any qualitative way
by assuming different disagreement payoffs. See Muthoo (1999) for a discussion of the Nash-bargaining outcome
and its relation to noncooperative bargaining solutions.
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Proposition 1 Let R′ be a concave function.9 Then, the right-to-manage model is monotone.
Efficient-Bargaining Models
In contrast to the inefficient right-to-manage outcome, efficient bargaining models assume that
management and the union strike an efficient agreement. To obtain a unique efficient solution,
it is commonly assumed that the bargaining outcome can be characterized by the generalized
Nash-bargaining solution, that is, the solution to the following problem:
max
lu,wu
φln(U(lu, wu)) + (1− φ)ln(R(lu)− wulu) (NB)
s.t. l − lu ≥ 0.
The following proposition shows that, in this case, the bargaining process is also monotone.
Proposition 2 The generalized Nash-bargaining model with joint bargaining over wages and
employment is monotone.
Propositions 1 and 2 thus confirm the appeal of monotonicity: not only does it seem to
be a sensible feature of a bargaining process, but it also characterizes the most widely used
bargaining models. Therefore, in the following sections we will abstract from the specificities of
the bargaining process and simply assume that it is monotone. All results will automatically
apply to the bargaining models discussed in this section.
5 Wage Setting and Union Avoidance
In the second period, the firm has to offer a wage at least as high as workers’ expected payoff
from unionization (net of organization costs) if it wants to remain nonunion. The following
proposition shows that remaining nonunion is the firm’s optimal strategy.10
9This is just a technical assumption made to guarantee that the solution to problem (RTM ) can be character-
ized by its first-order condition. The concavity of F is customarily, yet often implicitly, made in the literature,
and dropping it would make the solution to (RTM ) much more cumbersome without significantly altering the
results.
10The result generalizes to the case in which workers are risk-averse.
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Proposition 3 If the bargaining process is monotone, then, at the unique subgame perfect equi-
librium of the second period subgame, the firm offers
w(l∗) = max{wT (l∗), w},
where
wT (l) ≡ w + lu(l)
l
(wu(l)− w)− C(l)
l
,
and l∗ is the optimal employment level, and workers accept the wage offer.
It is straightforward to see why it is optimal for the firm to avoid unionization. For l such
that lu(l) = l, unionization would not reduce revenues, but it would imply a larger wage bill
(wul) than paying workers their expected payoff from unionization (wul−C(l)). For l such that
lu(l) < l, unionization would reduce revenues, while its effect on the wage bill would depend on
the magnitudes of (l− lu)w and C(l). While the latter effect could make unionization beneficial
to the firm for sufficiently large values of l, Proposition 3 shows that, at the optimal l, it is best
for the firm to avoid unionization.
Therefore, as proposed by the union threat view described in the introduction, in equilib-
rium, firms raise wages above w to completely eliminate workers’ incentives to organize, and
no unionization takes place. Only if C(l) is sufficiently large will the union threat become
ineffective, and the wage remain at the competitive level.
Note that we have assumed that the costs of organization are borne equally by all workers,
and that the firm tries to convince all workers not to unionize. Introducing worker heterogeneity
with respect to the costs of organization or allowing the firm to discriminate when setting wages
would not alter the results in any qualitative way.11
6 Employment Determination
Proposition 3 shows that it is profit-maximizing for the firm to pay a wage above w in the
second period to ensure that workers do not unionize. But it also shows that the wage necessary
11It is not clear whether the firm would be able to pay different wages to workers carrying out the same tasks,
and, interestingly, whether, if possible, it would be optimal to do so. In fact, apart from the potentially disruptive
morale problems that could ensue, Dickens (1986) has shown that, under certain conditions, it is cheaper to pay
all workers the same wage to dissuade them from organizing.
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to forestall unionization is influenced by second-period employment, l. Therefore, the firm will
take this influence into account when choosing its optimal employment level.
Before analyzing how this influence plays out, note that, when choosing second-period em-
ployment, l, the firm is constrained by the first-period choice of employment, l0. The determi-
nation of employment is thus an intertemporal decision problem, in which the choices of first-
and second-period employment are interrelated. However, it is instructive to leave aside the in-
tertemporal nature of the firm’s problem and look first at what the firm would do in the second
period if there were no constraints on l. The following proposition shows that the firm’s optimal
employment choice in such case, lT , is greater than the competitive employment level lc.
Proposition 4 Let lT be the solution to
max
l
R(l)− w(l)l s.t. w(l) = lu(l)l (wu(l)− w) + w − C(l)l
Then, lT ≥ lc.
Proposition 4 is a surprising result: it implies that the union threat leads firms to increase both
the wage and employment above competitive levels. However, it is straightforward to see how it
follows immediately from the monotonicity of the bargaining process. First, monotonicity implies
that, for l < l∗u, the profits of a nonunion firm are equal, leaving aside costs of organization, to
those that would be obtained if workers unionized (as, in this case, lu(l) = l). Therefore, it pays
off for the firm to employ at least l∗u workers, since monotonicity (condition (iii)) implies that a
lower employment level would reduce the firm’s profits under the union. Moreover, for l ≥ l∗u,
monotonicity implies that employing additional workers would not alter the union outcome. To
see what this implies for the firm’s employment choice, it is illuminating to imagine what would
happen if hiring and firing took place sequentially, so that the last workers hired were the first
fired. In this case, once l∗u workers have been hired, the next worker hired knows that he will
be fired in case of unionization. Therefore, it would be enough to pay this worker w to convince
him not to unionize, as he would not have anything to gain from unionization. This implies that,
as long as C is nondecreasing in l, the marginal cost of employment for l > l∗u is actually lower
than w, which explains the overemployment result. Although firing is random in the model, the
same intuition applies.
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A different way to understand the result is to realize that, when workers can unionize, the
marginal cost of labor is not constant and equal to the wage, as in competitive models. Rather,
since increasing l reduces workers’ expected payoff from unionization (either by reducing the
expected union wage or the probability of obtaining it), the marginal cost of labor is both lower
than the wage, so that the optimal employment-wage pair lies above the labor demand curve,
and decreasing in l.
It is worth mentioning that the wage-employment pair that results from the firm’s maxi-
mization problem is above the marginal revenue product curve (the competitive labor demand
curve). This type of outcome has been criticized in the context of wage bargaining models on
the grounds that it may not be incentive-compatible. The reasoning behind this criticism is that
the firm has incentives to reduce its labor force after the agreement has been reached, since, at
the negotiated outcome, the marginal cost of labor is higher than its marginal revenue product.
In our case, however, the wage-employment pair is incentive-compatible for the firm unless the
threat of unionization is a one-time event: as long as workers have the ability to unionize, it is
profit-maximizing for the firm not to deviate from the wage and employment levels derived in
Proposition 4.
As it was noted in the introduction, the possibility that the threat of unionization may lead
to over-employment had already been explored by Dickens (1986). Using a different model-
ing strategy and different assumptions about the ability of the union to discriminate between
workers with respect to wages and employment,12 Dickens (1986) showed that the threat of
unionization could increase or decrease employment. He realized that, for a given bargaining
outcome, increasing initial employment reduces the expected rents per worker of unionization,
although he did not seem to realize that the level of initial employment affects the negotiated
outcome itself. This section extends and generalizes these results, showing that, for a large class
of bargaining models, which includes the most commonly used models of union-management
bargaining, no underemployment will result.
It is also worth mentioning that a result along similar lines has been obtained by Stole and
Zwiebel (1996a) and (1996b) for the case of individual worker-firm bargaining. In these two
papers, Stole and Zwiebel showed that, for a firm bargaining individually with its workers, it is
12In particular, Dickens assumed that, if workers unionize, those who were active in the unionization process
can ensure that they are laid off only after all workers who were not active.
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optimal to hire more workers than in the competitive case, because, by doing so, the firm can
strike a better wage deal with all of them. Kuhn and Padilla (2002) obtained a similar result
using a different bargaining model. In their model, when workers bargain individually, overhiring
ensues for the same reasons as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) and (1996b). When workers bargain
collectively, Kuhn and Padilla (2002) also obtained an overemployment result because workers
competing for jobs at unionized firms underbid the market wage. It should be emphasized,
however, that, in these papers, there is some sort of wage bargaining between workers and the
firm, while, in our model, the firm unilaterally sets wages. The threat of collective bargaining,
not the actual bargaining between workers and the firm, is what drives our overhiring outcome.
There are two important dimensions of the firm’s problem, however, that are neglected by
the one-period result in Proposition 4. First, the firm may be able to undo the effects of the
union threat if it can recover in the first period, by setting a low enough w0, the rents that it
will be forced to pay workers in the second period. And second, workers’ lower productivity
in the first period may lead firms to set l0 below lT , which may attenuate the overemployment
result in Proposition 4. The intertemporal problem is fully analyzed next.
6.1 Intertemporal Wage and Employment Determination
To determine initial employment, l0, and wages, w0, and second-period employment, l, the
employer solves the following problem:
Maxw0,l0,lR0(l0)− w0l0 + δ[R(l)− w(l)l] (EMP)
s.t.
w(l) = max{wT (l), w} (1)
w0 + δ[
l
l0
w(l) +
l0 − l
l0
w] ≥ w(1 + δ) (2)
l ≤ l0, (3)
where
wT (l) ≡ lu(l)
l
(wu(l)− w) + w − C(l)
l
.
The parameter δ > 0 captures both the usual time-discount factor (assumed equal for firms
and workers) and the fact that the period during which workers accumulate specific skills (the
first period in the model) may be of different duration than the period during which skilled
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workers remain in the firm (the model’s second period). If both periods were of equal length,
then δ would be a pure time-discount factor and, thus, would be less than one. However, if, as
it is more likely, the expected tenure in the firm is large relative to the apprenticeship period, δ
may be larger than one.
Constraint (1) ensures that unionization does not take place in the second period (and also
that workers want to remain in the firm), while (2) is the first-period participation constraint.13
At the optimum, (2) will be binding, so that
w0 = w − δ l
l0
(w(l)− w) (4)
Therefore, substituting (4) into the firm’s profits, the employer’s problem reduces to (COMP):
Maxl0,l R0(l0)− wl0 + δ[R(l)− wl] (COMP)
s.t. l ≤ l0,
which is identical to the problem of a firm faced with a perfectly competitive labor market.
Therefore, the existence of a union threat would not affect the firm’s employment choices.
No-commitment. The above conclusion is hardly surprising, since, on the one hand, the firm
is able to recover, through a lower w0, the rents that it needs to grant workers in the second
period to avoid unionization (by setting its first-period wage according to (4)), and, on the
other hand, it can commit to the announcement of l made in the first period. Therefore, we
have sidestepped the potential distortions that the existence of quasi-rents in the second period
may create. If a firm can deviate from its announced l, however, it is conceivable that, since w0
depends on l, it may announce a level of second-period employment different from the one it
will choose in the second period, if, by doing so, it lowers w0. If workers foresee this, the firm’s
problem departs from (EMP), since the firm’s choice of l needs to be incentive-compatible in
the second period, that is, l needs to maximize second-period profits, given the choice of l0:
R(l)− w(l)l ≥ R(l′)− w(l′)l′, for all l′ ≤ l0 (IC )
13If workers could find employment in other firms where they could potentially unionize, the relevant reservation
payoff would be the maximum of their expected net present payoff in those firms and the right-hand-side of
inequality (2). Note that, if the supply of workers were infinitely elastic at w, in equilibrium, (2) would be binding
in any case.
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The next proposition shows, however, that the threat of unionization does not affect em-
ployment choices, even if the firm cannot credibly commit to second-period employment.
Proposition 5 Let (lˆ0, lˆ) be the solution to the two-period competitive problem (COMP), and
(l∗0, l∗) the solution to the firm’s problem under the threat of unionization (P ):
max
w0,l0,l
R0(l0)− w0l0 + δ[R(l)− w(l)l] (P)
s.t. (1)− (3), and (IC).
Then, l∗0 = l∗ = lˆ0 = lˆ.
The reason why the addition of constraint (IC ) does not alter the result obtained under
commitment is that, as Proposition 4 shows, the union threat provides incentives to hire more
rather than less workers. Therefore, if a firm announces to hire the competitive level of employ-
ment, the union threat will certainly not lead it to reduce employment below the announced
level. Moreover, the fact that workers are less productive in the first period implies that, at the
competitive solution, lˆ0 = lˆ. Therefore, in the second period the firm cannot deviate either from
the competitive level by increasing l above lˆ, as it is constrained by lˆ0.
6.2 Liquidity-Constrained Workers and Minimum Wages
The irrelevance of the union threat for employment implied by Proposition 5 hinges on the ability
of employers to pass on to workers, in the form of lower initial wages, the additional second-
period wage costs caused by the threat of unionization. However, this ability is likely to be, at
best, limited in actual markets. To see this, notice that, if a worker expects to remain in the firm
for long after acquiring specific skills, the parameter δ may be much larger than one,14 and, thus,
the minimum wage that workers are willing to accept to join the firm (w0 = w− δ ll0 (w(l)−w))
may be very low. If that is the case, liquidity constraints on the part of workers, or minimum
wage regulations may imply that such a w0 is not feasible. Therefore, it is necessary to study
the firm’s wage and employment determination problem when there is a lower bound for w0.
This lower bound is incorporated in the model by requiring w0 to be above an exogenously given
14For example, if workers’ time-discount rate was equal to 3%, and they expected to remain 15 years in the
firm after the initial year, δ =
∑15
i=1(
1
1.03
)i = 11.94.
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minimum w:
w0 ≥ w (LB)
The next proposition shows that constraining the ability of the firm to pass on second-period
labor costs to workers through low first-period wages does not lead to lower employment: even
if the union threat unequivocally increases the total discounted cost of labor, so that the firm is
forced to share rents with workers, employment will not be reduced relative to the competitive
problem.
Proposition 6 Let C be a convex function,15 and (l˜∗0, l˜∗) be the solution to (PR):
max
w0,l0,l
R0(l0)− w0l0 + δ[R(l)− w(l)l]
s.t. (1)− (3), (IC), and (LB).
Then l˜∗0 ≥ lˆ0 and l˜∗ ≥ lˆ.
In fact, if w and δ are sufficiently large, the firm’s problem will approach the one-period
problem discussed at the beginning of this section. Therefore, as Proposition 4 shows, if the
firm cannot recover the rents shared with workers in the second period, employment will tend
to be higher than in the competitive case.
7 Discussion
The previous sections have analyzed the behavior of a single firm. If we consider an industry
composed of identical firms facing an infinitely elastic labor supply at wage w,16 the results in
propositions 4-6 extend to the industry’s labor market equilibrium. Summarizing these results,
the partial equilibrium implications of workers’ ability to unionize are as follows:
1. The wage paid to experienced workers (those with the ability to unionize) will be higher
than in the competitive case, and it will be increasing in the size of the quasi-rents and the
expected bargaining power of the union, and decreasing in organization costs.
15Convexity of C is not a necessary condition. For the result to go through we only need C(l)
l
not to decrease
too fast with l.
16The wage w may be considered as the value of leisure or self-employment if this is the only industry in the
economy, or the wage paid in an alternative industry.
16
2. The wages of unexperienced workers will be lower than in the competitive case, and they
will be negatively related to the wages of experienced workers.
3. The wage-tenure profile will be steeper than in the competitive case. This implication
follows directly from the previous two.
These three implications are shared with models in which firm-specific human capital creates
rents over which firms and employees bargain individually. The present model, however, shows
that rent-sharing can take place even if there is no actual bargaining, and even if workers have
no individual bargaining power. All that is required is that there exists a threat of unionization.
Moreover, the model has the additional implication that both the wage levels and their difference
will depend on the costs of organization and the union’s bargaining power.
4. The net present value of wages will be equal or greater than in the competitive case. This
immediately implies that, if there is time-discounting, or if the constraint on w0 is binding, the
average wage (averaging across periods) will be higher than in the competitive case.17 In the
latter case, the net present value of wages will also be strictly higher than in the competitive
case.
5. The levels of employment of both experienced and unexperienced workers will be equal
or greater than the competitive employment levels.
Therefore, in a partial equilibrium context the implications of the model depart from those
of the textbook union threat view, since the increase in wages caused by the union threat is
not accompanied by a reduction in employment. The comparison with the crowding view is less
straightforward, because, in the model, no unions form in equilibrium. However, even if they
did for some reason not specified in the model, and even if their presence reduced w, the net
effect on nonunion wages could be positive or negative, depending on the relative strengths of
the supply shift (the reduction in w) and the upward pressure on wages caused by the union
threat. In any case, even if wages fell as a consequence of unionization, the decrease would be
smaller than the one that would follow from a purely competitive model.
An additional implication that follows from monotonicity is that the hiring activity of union-
ized employers may increase significantly right before contract renegotiation, as firms try to put
pressure on unions to accept lower wages.
17Time-discounting implies that the present value of a sequence of future wages is less than the sum of that
sequence.
17
8 Conclusion
A basic feature of the labor markets of most advanced economies is that workers can–or at least
can try to–organize to bargain collectively with their employers. This possibility implies that
employers will take into account the effect of their choices on workers’ incentives to unionize and
thus adds a strategic dimension to wage and employment determination. This paper has shown
that, once we consider the strategic nature of wage and employment determination under the
threat of unionization, we obtain predictions that differ from the ones derived from standard
models. In particular, the main result of this paper is that workers’ ability to unionize will lead
nonunion firms to pay higher than competitive wages and, at the same time, to set a level of
employment equal or greater than the competitive employment level. We show this result to
hold for a very general class of potential union-management bargaining processes, including the
most commonly used ones in the literature.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. 1. Solution to the unconstrained problem. Let w∗u be the solution
to problem (A):
max
wu
FA(wu), (A)
where
FA(wu) ≡ φln(U(luA(wu), wu) + (1− φ)ln(R(luA(wu))− wuluA(wu)), (5)
and luA(wu) ≡ argmaxlu{R(lu)−wulu}. That is, problem (A) is a bargaining problem with no
constraints on lu. Given concavity of R, luA(wu) satisfies
R′(luA(wu)) = wu (6)
l′uA(wu) =
1
R′′(luA(wu))
< 0 (7)
The first order condition of problem (A) is:
φ
1
(w∗u − w)
+ φ
l′uA(w
∗
u)
luA(w∗u)
− (1− φ) luA(w
∗
u)
R(luA(w∗u))− w∗uluA(w∗u)
= 0
It can be checked that R′′′ ≤ 0 is a sufficient condition for the concavity of FA and, therefore,
also a sufficient condition for the maximality of w∗u.
Let l∗u = luA(w∗u), and let lc = luA(w) be the competitive employment level. Then, by
concavity of R, w∗u > w implies that l∗u < lc.
2. Solution to (RTM ) when l > l∗u. Define lu(wu, l) as the solution to (L):
max
lu
{R(lu)− wulu} (L)
s.t. lu ≤ l.
For l > l∗u, we know from problem (A) that F (w∗u, l) = FA(w∗u) > FA(wu) for any wu < w∗u.
That is, if lu(wu, l) = luA(wu), then F (w∗u, l) > F (wu, l), or, put differently, (w∗u, l∗u) is preferred
to any other (wu, lu) on the R′ curve. However, the restriction lu ≤ l in problem (L) implies
that bargaining outcomes with wu < R′(l) and lu(wu, l) = l < luA(wu) could be possible. We
need to check that (w∗u, l∗u) is also preferred to any (wu, lu) such that wu < R′(l).
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Let wu < R′(l), so that the restriction in problem (L) is strictly binding. In this case:
Fwu(wu, l) = φ
1
(wu − w) − (1− φ)
l
R(l)− wul ,
and
Fwuwu = −φ
1
(wu − w)2 − (1− φ)
l2
(R(l)− wul)2 < 0,
so that, for wu < R′(l), Fwu(wu, l) > Fwu−(R′(l), l), and
Fwu−(R
′(l), l) = φ
1
(R′(l)− w) − (1− φ)
l
R(l)−R′(l)l
> φ
1
(R′(l)− w) + φ
l′uA(R
′(l))
l
− (1− φ) l
R(l)−R′(l)l = F
′
A(R
′(l)) > 0,
where the last inequality follows from F ′A(w
∗
u) = 0, R
′(l) < w∗u, and concavity of FA.
Therefore, Fwu(wu, l) > 0 for wu < R′(l), which implies that (l, R′(l)) is preferred to (l, wu)
for wu < R′(l), and thus that (w∗u, l∗u) is preferred to any (wu, l) with wu ≤ R′(l). It follows that
for any l > l∗u, (wu(l), lu(l)) = (w∗u, l∗u), so that condition (ii.b) in the definition of monotonicity
is satisfied.
3. Solution to (RTM ) when l ≤ l∗u. For l < l∗u, if wu > R′(l), lu(wu, l) = luA(wu), so that
F (wu, l) = FA(wu). It follows that, for wu > R′(l), Fwu(wu, l) = F ′A(wu) < 0 and, therefore,
that wu(l) ≤ R′(l) and lu(l) = l, so that condition (ii.a) in the definition of monotonicity is
satisfied.
Now, let H(l) be defined as:
H(l) = φ
1
(R′(l)− w) − (1− φ)
l
R(l)−R′(l)l , (8)
that is, H(l) = Fwu−(R′(l), l). Since, we showed above that Fwu−(R′(l), l) > Fwu(wu, l), for any
wu < R
′(l), H(l) ≥ 0 implies that wu(l) = R′(l), and H(l) < 0 implies that wu(l) < R′(l). For
H so defined:
H ′(l) = −φ R
′′(l)
(R′(l)− w)2 − (1− φ)
R−R′l + l2R′′
(R−R′l)2 (9)
Concavity of R′ implies that −lR′′(l) ≥ R′(0)−R′(l), so that:
R(l)−R′(l)l + l2R′′(l) ≤ R(l)−R′(l)l + l(R′(l)−R′(0)) = R(l)− lR′(0) < 0, (10)
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where the last inequality follows from concavity of R. Therefore H ′(l) > 0.
Now, recall that F ′A(w
∗
u) = 0, which, since l
′
uA < 0 and w
∗
u = R
′(l∗u), implies
H(l∗u) = F
′
A(w
∗
u)− φ
l′uA(w
∗
u)
l∗u
> 0
Therefore, since H ′ > 0, there exists an lb < l∗u such that, for l ≥ lb, H(l) ≥ 0 and
wu(l) = R′(l), and, for l < lb, H(l) < 0 and wu(l) < R′(l). Hence, for l ≥ lb, wu(l) is decreasing
in l because of concavity of R. For l < lb, wu(l) is given by:18
φ
1
(wu(l)− w) − (1− φ)
l
R(l)− wu(l)l = 0, (11)
or, rearranging,
wu(l) = φ
R(l)
l
+ (1− φ)w (12)
Therefore wu(l) is also decreasing in l for l < lb, so that wu(l) is decreasing for l < l∗u. Together
with condition (ii.b), this implies condition (i).
Condition (iii) follows immediately from the above argument. For l < lb, wu(l) = φ
R(l)
l +
(1−φ)w, so that ΠU (l) = (R(l)−wl)(1−φ) and Π′U (l) = (R′(l)−w)(1−φ) ≥ 0. For l ∈ (lb, l∗u),
wu(l) = R′(l), so that Π′U (l) = R
′(l)−R′(l)−R′′(l)l ≥ 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. The generalized Nash-bargaining problem is:
max
lu,wu
φln(U(lu, wu)) + (1− φ)ln(R(lu)− wulu) (NB)
s.t. l − lu ≥ 0
Given that concavity of R guarantees the concavity of the maximand, the necessary and
sufficient conditions for a maximum are (after some rearranging):
wu = φ
R
lu
+ (1− φ)w (13)
wu = φ
R
lu
+ (1− φ)R′ − λ(R− wulu) (14)
λ(l − lu) = 0 (15)
λ ≥ 0 (16)
l − lu ≥ 0 (17)
18Note that lb could be negative, so that there could be no l ≥ 0 such that H(l) < 0. Note also that Fwu →∞
as wu → w, so that, for l < lb, at the maximum Fwu = 0.
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Now, note that concavity of R guarantees that there is a unique optimum, (w∗u, l∗u), to a
modified problem in which the restriction l − lu ≥ 0 is eliminated (i.e. (w∗u, l∗u) solves the above
system of equations for λ = 0). It is a standard result in the literature (see, for example, Booth
(1995)) that l∗u = lc, where lc is the competitive outcome.
If (17) is not binding, λ = 0, and the solution (lu(l), wu(l)) is identical with (w∗u, l∗u). There-
fore, for l ≥ l∗u, (wu(l), lu(l)) = (w∗u, l∗u), so that condition (ii.b) of the definition of monotonicity
is satisfied.
If l < l∗u, it has to be the case that λ > 0 (as (w∗u, l∗u) is the unique solution to (13)-(17) if
λ = 0), so that (17) will be binding. It follows that lu(l) = l, satisfying condition (ii.a), and
that wu(l) is given by (13), so that wu(l) is decreasing in l for l < l∗u. Together with condition
(ii.b) this implies that condition (i) is satisfied.
Now, for l < l∗u,
d(wu(l)lu(l))
dl = φR
′(l) + (1 − φ)w, so that ΠU (l)′ = R′(l) − d(wu(l)lu(l))dl =
(1− φ)(R′(l)− w) > 0, since l < l∗u = lc, which proves condition (iii). ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. If the firm offers a wage below w∗(l), workers form a union and
profits are ΠU (l) = R(lu(l))− wu(l)lu(l). If it offers w∗(l), and workers accept, profits are:
Π(l) = R(l)− l
(
lu(l)
l
wu(l) +
l − lu(l)
l
w − C(l)
l
)
= R(l)− lu(l)wu(l)− w(l − lu(l)) + C(l)
(18)
Let l∗u be as described in the definition of monotonicity and let l∗ be the optimal employment
level given the constraint l ≤ l0. It follows that ΠU (l∗u) ≥ ΠU (l) for any l. Moreover, Π(l∗u) =
R(l∗u)− l∗uwu∗+C(l∗u) > ΠU (l∗u). It follows that, if l∗u is feasible (l0 ≥ l∗u), Π(l∗) ≥ Π(l∗u) > ΠU (l)
for any feasible l. If l∗u is not feasible (l0 < l∗u), then, by monotonicity, lu(l) = l, so that, for
any feasible l, Π(l) = R(l)− lu(l)wu(l) +C(l) = ΠU (l) +C(l). Therefore, Π(l∗) > ΠU (l) for any
feasible l. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. For l < l∗u, monotonicity implies that lu(l) = l, so that w(l) =
wu(l) − C(l)l , and profits are Π(l) = R(l) − wu(l)l + C(l) = ΠU (l) + C(l). Monotonicity also
implies that ΠU (l) is nondecreasing in l. Therefore, if C is nondecreasing, for l < l∗u, Π(l) is
nondecreasing in l, so that lT ≥ l∗u.
Now, for l > l∗u, monotonicity implies that lu(l) = l∗u, and wu(l) = w∗u, so that (w(l)l) =
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l∗uw∗u + (l − l∗u)w − C(l). Therefore, Π′(l) = R′(l)− (w(l)l)′ = R′(l)− w + C ′(l). It follows that,
as long as C ′ ≥ 0, Π′(l) > 0 for l < lc (as R′(lc) = w). Therefore, lT ≥ lc. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5. First note that the assumption that R′(l) > R′0(l) for all l implies
that the restriction l ≤ l0 is binding at the solution to the competitive problem (COMP), since
R′0(lc)−w+δ(R′(lc)−w) < 0. Therefore, the competitive solution is (lˆ, lˆ), where lˆ < lc satisfies:
R′0(lˆ) − w + δ(R′(lˆ) − w) = 0. It follows that (lˆ, lˆ) satisfies (IC ), since in the previous proof it
was shown that, for l < lc, Π′(l) ≥ 0, so that it is not optimal to reduce l below lˆ, and it is not
possible to increase l above l0 = lˆ. Therefore, (l∗0, l∗) = (lˆ, lˆ). ¥
Proof of Proposition 6. For lT defined in Proposition 4, we can rearrange problem (PR) as
a univariate maximization problem:
Maxl0R0(l0)− w0(l0)l0 + δ[R(l(l0))− w(l0)l(l0)]
s.t.
w0(l0) = max
{
w,w − δ l(l0)
l0
(w(l0)− w)
}
l(l0) = lT if l0 ≥ lT , and l(l0) = l0 if l0 < lT
w(l0) = max
{
lu(l(l0))
l(l0)
(wu(l(l0))− w) + w − C(l(l0))
l(l0)
, w
}
,
where the second restriction makes use of the fact that, by monotonicity, l = l0, unless l0 > lT .
This problem is identical to the problem where w0 is unrestricted except for the fact that w0 ≥ w
is now required. Let wT0 (l0) = w− δ l(l0)l0 (w(l0)−w) be the unrestricted w0. If the restriction on
w0 is not effective at (l∗0, l∗), then (l˜∗0, l˜∗) = (l∗0, l∗), since, if the restriction is effective for some
other l0, it only makes the latter less preferable by increasing w0(l0).
Suppose now that w0T (l∗0) < w, so that the restriction is binding at (l∗0, l∗):
1. For l0 such that
lu(l(l0))
l(l0)
(wu(l(l0))− w) + w − C(l(l0))l(l0) > w :
1.a. If l0 < l∗u, then l(l0) = lu(l0) = l0 and w0T (l0) = w − δ(wu(l0) − C(l0)l0 − w), so that
w′0T (l0) = −δw′u(l0)+δC
′(l0)l0−C(l0)
l20
≥ 0, because of convexity of C, and monotonicity.
1.b. If l0 ∈ (l∗u, lT ), then lu(l0) < l(l0) = l0 and w0T (l0) = w − δl0 (l∗u(w∗u − w) − C(l0)), so
that w′0T (l0) =
δ
l20
(l∗u(w∗u − w)− C(l0) + C ′(l0)l0) ≥ 0, because of convexity of C.
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2. For l0 such that
lu(l(l0))
l(l0)
(wu(l(l0))− w) + w − C(l(l0))l(l0) < w, w′0T (l0) = 0.
3. For lu(l(l0))l(l0) (wu(l(l0))− w) + w −
C(l(l0))
l(l0)
= w, w′0T−(l0) = 0, and w
′
0T+(l0) ≥ 0.
Therefore, since l∗0 < lT , w0T (l0) is increasing in l0 for l0 < l∗0. This means that if at the
unrestricted optimum w0T (l∗0) ≤ w, then w0T (l0) ≤ w for any l0 < l∗0. Therefore, if l∗0 was
preferred to an l0 < l∗0 when w0(l0) < w0(l∗0), it will still be preferred when w0(l0) = w0(l∗0) = w.
It follows that, at the optimum, l0 has to be at least as large as the unrestricted optimum. ¥
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